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A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO SOCIOECONOMIC 
AND POLITICAL DIMENSIONS WORLDWIDE
Luca Salvati, Kostas Rontos, Ioannis Vavouras1
ABSTRACT The present study investigates relevant economic, social and political 
dimensions of development worldwide, focusing on (apparent and latent) links 
between perceived corruption, economic and human development, government 
effectiveness and the quality of the political system taken as representative variables 
of countries’ social systems. These variables were selected as the basic determinants 
of the level of overall development in a country, since combinations of these factors 
determine clusters of countries with different development patterns. The results of 
this study indicate that effective development policies require integrated strategies 
that incorporate efforts to reduce corruption and increase human development and 
government effectiveness. These strategies are sustainable in the long run when 
associated with institutional transformations. More specifically, if democracy is 
not consolidated and the political system is not grounded on the basis of freedom, 
socioeconomic development cannot be achieved and maintained in the long term, 
even with a high level of per-capita income.
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INTRODUCTION
Development has been mainly evaluated from an economic perspective, 
with social and institutional aspects being underestimated for several reasons, 
including the fact that the latter cannot be as easily measured as the former. 
Economic figures are assessed in almost all countries with comparable 
approaches and relatively simple and widely acceptable indexes such as income 
per capita, while the social and institutional aspects of human action can only be 
successfully expressed through more complicated procedures about which there 
is only partial agreement. However, positive and normative interest in the social 
and institutional dimensions of development remains high, as economic growth 
is recognized as a partial condition of the wealth of nations. 
Wealth equality, a fair distribution of economic benefits, the effective 
reduction of corruption, good governance, better social security, high-quality 
health and education systems are relevant factors characterizing the level of 
overall development in modern societies. A higher level of governance, as it 
is usually perceived, through more effective government and high standards 
of political rights and democracy allow nations to satisfy social needs more 
efficiently, so that citizens may live in a comfortable, fair and secure sociopolitical 
environment. The recent worldwide economic crisis has proved that what 
often lies behind an economic crisis is a hidden social and institutional crisis. 
Economic development is not guaranteed in the long term unless it is associated 
with a high level of social and political development. The countries of the world 
affected more deeply by the economic crisis and sovereign debt crisis seem to 
be those in which the level of social and political development are moderate or 
even low. This statement is not surprising since social cohesion and democratic 
institutions help with discovering and implementing appropriate solutions for 
overcoming economic problems. 
International agencies have recently developed methodologies for measuring 
variables that express the social and political dimensions (or aspects) of 
development. These empirical frameworks consider the overall development 
of countries as a multidimensional phenomenon associated with a variety of 
social, economic and institutional factors, including per-capita income, human 
development, government effectiveness, reduction of income (and wealth) 
inequalities, social transformations, reduced corruption and democratic political 
systems. 
The objective of the present study is to investigate a broad range of factors 
(income per capita, human development, government effectiveness, political 
freedom in the forms of political rights and civil liberties, and corruption), 
intended as relevant indicators of the level of a country’s development. Based 
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on a preliminary investigation by Rontos et al. (2013), the present study 
focuses on the way multiple combinations of these factors determine distinct 
development patterns worldwide. Our analysis reveals that these factors are 
partly correlated, and inter-linkages are particularly important in determining 
the extent of the development of individual countries. Assuming that political 
rights and civil liberties represent the level of political development of countries, 
while the remaining variables represent the socioeconomic dimension of 
overall development, a multivariate strategy was implemented with the aim of 
(i) identifying relevant, latent components of development related to the factors 
described above, and (ii) profiling similarities among countries and homogeneous 
clusters across continents based on the adopted indicators.  
EXPLORING MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF 
SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The most widely used indicator of level of economic development is real income 
per-capita. Although criticized as an inadequate proxy of the level of overall 
development – mainly as an inefficient measure of living standards and quality of 
life prevailing in a country – per-capita income is still recognized as the best single 
available measure of average level of economic development. The level of overall 
development is also associated with the degree of human development, widely 
considered a wider notion than economic development. Human development 
refers to the expansion of people’s freedoms and capabilities to live their lives 
as they choose (UNDP 2009). Human development is both a process and an 
outcome. It not only involves the process through which human choices are 
enlarged, but it also focuses on the outcomes of the enlarged choices (UNDP 
2002).
Overall development is also associated with the degree of government 
effectiveness. An effective public sector promotes all three dimensions of 
development. Kaufmann et al. (2009) define governance as “the traditions 
and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes 
the processes by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; 
the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound 
policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern 
economic and social interactions among them.”
A strong connection also exists between the level of overall development and 
the quality of the political system. Underdevelopment is widely considered to 
be both a symptom and a cause of the malfunctioning of democratic institutions 
(Warren 2004). Moreover, democracy and consequent public accountability 
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reduce the costs of development. In a sense, the political system or the “political 
macrostructure” is responsible for determining the political motivation of all 
players in a state system. The reaction to these factors determines the behavior 
of state bureaucracy (Lederman et al. 2005). As a result, a highly developed and 
well-functioning democracy serves as a tool for increasing the level of overall 
development (Zhang et al. 2009). Similarly to the vision of political science, the 
new wave of institutional economics argues that institutions play a decisive role 
in sustainable development and growth, ultimately claiming that democracy 
stimulates growth in a direct (or indirect) way (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2002).
A relevant variable associated with economic, social and institutional 
dimensions of development is the level of perceived (public-sector) corruption 
in a country, indicating the abuse of entrusted power for private gain. It has been 
acknowledged from the first stages of human civilization that whoever is in a 
position to exercise power may also be in a position to use their public office 
for individual benefit. Public-sector corruption is usually defined as the abuse 
of public power for private benefit (Tanzi 1998, 2000) or the abuse of public 
office for private gain (Martinez-Vazquez et al. 2007). Johnston (2001) has 
formulated an analysis of the concept and the various definitions of corruption. 
The World Bank has defined public sector corruption as the abuse of public 
authority for private interest (World Bank 1997). OECD defines public sector 
corruption as the misuse of public office, roles or resources for private benefit, 
material or otherwise (OECD 1996). While related to personal gain on some 
occasions, corruption can have several facets, such as bribery, embezzlement, 
fraud, extortion and nepotism (Amundsen 1999). Beneficiaries may include so-
called third parties, namely family, friends or the political party to which the 
individual belongs. While corruption is seen as a “disease” inherent to public 
power and an indication of bad governance (Treisman 2000; Paldam 2002; de 
Vaal – Ebben 2011; Lalountas et al. 2011), the “grease theory” – which argues 
that corruption “lubricates the wheels” and fosters efficiency – might complicate 
these conclusions, proposing a more general view of the phenomenon which is 
widely diffused across all continents (Leff 1964; Huntington 1968; Lambsdorff 
2007; Aidt 2009). Although corruption can be observed in both the private and 
the public sector, the vast bulk of economic literature examines only public sector 
corruption, for two main reasons. First, the phenomenon is mainly associated 
with the public sector, and second, widely accepted private-sector corruption 
indices have not yet been constructed, rendering the relevant empirical research 
extremely difficult.
Corruption is a complex and multidimensional phenomenon with several 
causes and effects and numerous associated factors. The most important of 
these are level of economic development, type of political authority, quality of 
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institutional framework, effectiveness of justice system, degree of globalization, 
level of competition, structure and size of public sector, as well as cultural 
quality, geographical location and history. In summary, widespread corruption 
largely indicates the existence of institutional and political weaknesses as well 
as economic and social underdevelopment. Corruption has been accepted as 
the single most significant barrier to both democratization and economic 
development (Rose-Ackerman 1999; Sung 2002; Rontos et al. 2013).
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data
Our analysis is based on six variables made available for 167 countries, 
referring to the year 2010 with no missing data. In regard to the ensemble of 
indicators adopted in this study, more recent data sometimes replaced missing 
values for some of the 167 countries considered in the analysis. Variables were 
derived from official statistics and other reliable international data sources, as 
explained in the following sub-sections. The final data matrix prepared by the 
authors is available for further studies upon request. 
Corruption
The corruption perceptions index (CPI), widely used in comparative 
investigations and provided annually by the nongovernmental organization 
Transparency International, was incorporated into this study with elementary 
country data referring to the year 2010. The CPI is a composite index based 
on a variety of data derived from 13 surveys carried out by 10 independent 
organizations that measure corruption on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 represents 
the highest possible corruption level. High scores indicate a low perceived level 
of corruption in a given country. Despite the fact that the CPI is not the outcome 
of the objective quantitative measurement of corruption – representing the most 
relevant conceptual limitation of this indicator – it reveals how this phenomenon 
is perceived within local societies. The major strength of the CPI lies in the 
combination of multiple data sources in a single index, a fact that increases the 
reliability of each country’s score (Lambsdorff 2006).2
2 For an extended analysis and assessment of the various indicators of corruption, see mainly UNDP (2008).
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Per-capita income
Per-capita Gross National Income in purchasing power parity or current 
international dollars (GNIpc,ppp) is used to approximate the level of economic 
development in each country. GNIpc,ppp is gross national income (GNI) converted 
to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international 
dollar has the same purchasing power over GNI as a US dollar has in the United 
States.3 GNIpc,ppp is a key indicator in economic analyses when the objective 
is to compare broad differences between countries in living standards since 
purchasing power parities take into account the relative cost of living in various 
countries. GNIpc,ppp is an indicator widely used in international comparisons of 
economic development (World Bank 2010a).
Human development
The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary estimation of the level 
of human development based on non-income measures that integrates measures 
of life expectancy in birth, mean years of schooling, expected years of schooling 
and gross national income (GNI) per-capita. Estimated by the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), it measures the average achievements in a given 
country in three relevant dimensions of human development: a long and healthy 
life, access to knowledge, and a decent standard of living. Despite its inherent 
limitations, the index is a useful comparative measure of the level of human 
development. Based on the HDI, countries are classified into three categories: 
(i) high human development with HDI > 0.8, (ii) medium human development 
with 0.5 < HDI < 0.8, and (iii) low human development with HDI < 0.5. The data 
used refer to the year 2010.
Government effectiveness
To express Government Effectiveness, the relevant World Bank government 
effectiveness indicator (GE) is used. This indicator is very useful because it 
aims at capturing the quality of public services provided, the quality of the civil 
service and its degree of independence from political pressure, the quality of 
policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to such policies. The aim of the indicator is therefore to capture 
3 See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD.
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the capacity of the public sector to implement sound policies. GE is one of the 
six indicators of broad dimensions of governance (the so-called worldwide 
governance indicators (WGI)) that have covered over 200 countries since 1996 
and are produced by Kaufmann et al. (2010) and the World Bank (2010b). Values 
of GE range between -2.5 and 2.5. Actually, the variable has been standardized 
(with mean 0 and standard deviation 1), so that cross-country- and time-related 
differences in the measurement scale are avoided. Higher values correspond 
to better governance. This indicator assesses subjective perceptions regarding 
government effectiveness and is not the outcome of quantitative measurement.
Political rights
The “political rights” index (PR) provided by the organization Freedom House 
(2010) integrates three indicators; namely, electoral process, political pluralism, 
and participation/functioning of government. The index is estimated by the 
Freedom House organization (2013). The PR index ranges from 1 (a very free 
country) to 7 (a country which is not free). According to the PR index, countries 
are characterized as Free (F) if they score 1.0-2.5 on the 1-7 scale, Partly Free 
(PF) if they score 3.0-5.0 on the 1-7 scale, and Not Free (NF) if they score 5.5-7.0 
on the 1-7 scale.
Civil liberties
The “Civil Liberties” index (CL) is estimated by the Freedom House 
organization (2013)4 and is based on the evaluation of four partial indicators, 
namely, freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational 
rights, rule of law, personal autonomy, and individual rights. According to the 
CL index, countries are characterized as free (F) if they score 1.0-2.5 on the 1-7 
scale, partly free (PF) if they score 3.0-5.0 on the 1-7 scale, and not free (NF) if 
they score 5.5-7.0 on the 1-7 scale.
4 For more details, see Methodological Summary, Freedom House (2013).
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Methodology
The collected variables were standardized prior to analysis. A three-step 
multivariate strategy based on a pair-wise Spearman non-parametric rank 
correlation analysis, a Principal Component Analysis (PCA), and a non-
hierarchical Cluster Analysis (CA) was developed with the aim of characterizing 
the socioeconomic and political system of each country according to the 
selected economic and non-economic features that describe the level of overall 
development in each country. Multivariate analysis allows for a comprehensive 
classification of countries based on partly redundant input variables (e.g. Salvati 
2013; Pili et al. 2017; Duvernoy et al. 2018). 
Non-parametric correlations
A pairwise Spearman non-parametric co-graduation analysis was carried 
out separately for each variable to test if significant correlations exist over the 
whole ensemble of countries (n = 167). Significant correlations at p < 0.001 
were identified after Bonferroni’s correction for multiple comparisons (Zitti 
et al. 2015). A non-parametric analysis was preferred to a classical parametric 
analysis (e.g. using Pearson correlation coefficients) with the aim of detecting 
both linear and non-linear significant pairwise relationships between variables, 
without stringent requisites about normality (Rontos et al. 2016).
Principal Component Analysis
A PCA was undertaken on the six variables available for the investigated 
countries in order to extract and summarize the latent factors describing the 
socioeconomic context and the possible relationships with corruption and to 
complement the results obtained from the non-parametric Spearman correlation 
analysis. As the PCA was based on the correlation matrix, the number of significant 
axes (m) was chosen by retaining the components with eigenvalue > 1. Outputs 
of the PCA include eigenvalues of the main components, variable loadings, and 
country scores. 
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K-means Clustering
Non-hierarchical k-means clustering was carried out with the aim of separating 
countries into a few groups with homogeneous socioeconomic and political patterns 
and corruption levels. The best partition (i.e. the optimal number of clusters for 
group separation) was chosen according to the Cubic Clustering Criterion that 
works through maximizing the proportion of within-group variance to between-
group variance. Outputs of the CA include the average of each of the six considered 
variables by cluster, together with cluster membership and the multivariate distance 
from the centroid of each cluster by country. An Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was 
finally used to identify which variables contribute most to the cluster differentiation.
RESULTS
Non-parametric correlations
Pairwise Spearman co-graduation analysis indicates the existence of 
important relationships among the considered variables (Table 1). The CPI was 
correlated to all the remaining variables, increasing with GE, GNI and HDI and 
decreasing with CL and PR. The highest correlation coefficient was found for 
the relationship between GNI and HDI, possibly indicating that gross national 
income can be considered a proxy for the level of socioeconomic development in 
the countries investigated in the present study. While being positively correlated 
to CL, PR was negatively associated with GE. Finally, GE was negatively 
correlated to CL. In general, the relationships between the above variables are 
the ones postulated by relevant theory.
Table 1 Pairwise Spearman non-parametric correlation analysis between the varia-
bles investigated in each country (bold indicates significant correlations at p < 0.001 
after Bonferroni’s correction for multiple comparisons).
 Variable PR GNI HDI GE CL
CPI -0.66 0.75 0.75 0.92 -0.70
PR -0.46 -0.56 -0.65 0.94
GNI 0.95 0.80 -0.52
HDI 0.83 -0.61
GE     -0.70
Source: Authors’ elaboration using survey dataset, various statistical sources; see Section Data.
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Principal Component Analysis
PCA extracted two relevant axes, accounting respectively for 73.6% and 
16.8% of total variance with a cumulated variance explained by the two main 
axes of more than 90% (Table 2). All variables were found to be associated with 
factor 1 (PR and CL with positive loadings, the remaining four with negative 
loadings) which indicates an axis of economic development together with 
increasing corruption level. However, the highest contributions to the axis are 
from GE, CPI and HDI. Factor 2 is negatively associated with civil liberties 
and political rights, possibly indicating that the cultural and institutional 
factors influencing these variables are only partly correlated to the level of 
socioeconomic development in a country. 
Table 2 Summary results of the Principal Component Analysis applied to the matrix 
composed of countries (by row) and the six investigated variables (by column)
Variable
Component loadings Contribution
PC 1 PC 2 PC 1 PC 2
CPI -0.92 -0.19 0.19 0.03
PR 0.76 -0.62 0.13 0.38
GNI -0.82 -0.48 0.15 0.22
HDI -0.85 -0.25 0.16 0.06
GE -0.95 -0.14 0.21 0.02
CL 0.82 -0.54 0.15 0.28
Variance (%) 73.6 -
Cumulated variance (%)  16.8 90.4
Source: Authors’ elaboration using survey dataset, various statistical sources; See Section Data.
Table 3 reports the countries’ scores for the two main components. Developed 
countries with consolidated democracies had negative scores on both the first 
and second axes while economically-disadvantaged and poor countries with 
very unstable political systems are clustered along the positive side of the first 
and second axes.
Table 3 Component scores for each country for the two principal components
Country PC1 PC2  Country PC1 PC2  Country PC1 PC2
Afghanistan 1.52 -0.33 Germany -1.74 -0.24 Nigeria 0.99 0.31
Albania 0.04 0.39 Ghana -0.06 1.66 Norway -2.14 -1.00
Algeria 0.65 -0.93 Greece -0.80 0.37 Oman -0.06 -1.86
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Country PC1 PC2  Country PC1 PC2  Country PC1 PC2
Angola 1.14 -0.37 Guatemala 0.56 0.22 Pakistan 0.87 0.16
Argentina -0.26 0.72 Guinea 1.53 -0.65 Panama -0.43 1.01
Armenia 0.50 -0.61 Guinea–Bissau 1.03 0.78 Papua New Guinea 0.72 0.85
Australia -1.89 -0.34 Guyana 0.17 1.02 Paraguay 0.42 0.79
Austria -1.81 -0.31 Haiti 1.14 0.42 Peru -0.07 0.65
Azerbaijan 0.74 -0.89 Honduras 0.59 0.24 Philippines 0.33 0.43
Bahrain -0.08 -1.83 Hong Kong -1.50 -2.04 Poland -0.96 0.82
Bangladesh 0.71 0.79 Hungary -0.91 0.86 Portugal -1.17 0.55
Barbados -1.34 0.54 Iceland -1.69 -0.01 Qatar -1.13 -3.86
Belarus 0.88 -1.65 India 0.18 1.07 Romania -0.33 0.69
Belgium -1.65 -0.16 Indonesia 0.18 1.02 Russia 0.50 -1.31
Benin 0.38 1.71 Iran 0.76 -1.30 Rwanda 0.81 -0.51
Bhutan 0.19 -0.42 Iraq 1.16 -0.41 Samoa -0.17 1.08
Bolivia 0.26 0.69 Ireland -1.64 -0.08 Sao Tome and Principe 0.30 1.59
Bosnia 
Herzegovina 0.24 0.17 Israel -1.22 0.07 Saudi Arabia 0.29 -2.32
Botswana -0.43 0.35 Italy -0.89 0.20 Senegal 0.52 1.05
Brazil -0.27 0.85 Jamaica -0.12 0.66 Serbia -0.26 0.82
Brunei -0.59 -2.85 Japan -1.54 -0.40 Seychelles -0.42 -0.29
Bulgaria -0.33 0.72 Jordan 0.36 -1.11 Sierra Leone 0.87 1.40
Burkina Faso 0.83 0.67 Kazakhstan 0.51 -1.11 Singapore -1.57 -3.05
Burundi 1.22 0.58 Kenya 0.74 0.48 Slovakia -0.95 0.78
Cambodia 1.06 -0.39 Kiribati -0.01 1.98 Slovenia -1.31 0.35
Cameroon 1.21 -0.64 Korea (South) -1.18 0.03 Solomon Islands 0.65 0.76
Canada -1.91 -0.39 Kuwait -0.54 -1.77 South Africa -0.29 0.90
Cape Verde -0.32 1.77 Kyrgyzstan 0.92 -0.54 Spain -1.32 0.24
Cent. African 
Republic 1.31 0.27 Laos 1.26 -0.98 Sri Lanka 0.31 -0.03
Chad 1.65 -0.56 Latvia -0.74 0.72 Sudan 1.64 -1.00
Chile -1.19 0.73 Lebanon 0.23 -0.27 Swaziland 0.92 -0.93
China 0.65 -1.64 Lesotho 0.44 0.99 Sweden -1.99 -0.48
Colombia 0.06 0.04 Liberia 0.91 1.05 Switzerland -2.04 -0.72
Comoros 1.01 1.06 Libya 0.97 -2.04 Syria 0.98 -1.31
Congo – 
Brazzaville 1.39 -0.04 Lithuania -0.91 0.89 Tajikistan 0.98 -0.50
Costa Rica -0.70 1.22 Luxembourg -2.07 -0.98 Tanzania 0.62 0.79
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Country PC1 PC2  Country PC1 PC2  Country PC1 PC2
Cote d’Ivoire 1.29 -0.16 Madagascar 0.95 -0.05 Thailand 0.28 -0.47
Croatia -0.69 0.68 Malawi 0.63 0.81 Togo 1.07 0.41
Cyprus -1.41 0.22 Malaysia -0.28 -0.69 Tonga 0.33 0.02
Czech 
Republic -1.07 0.64 Maldives 0.33 0.30
Trinidad and 
Tobago -0.51 0.36
Denmark -1.94 -0.47 Mali 0.66 1.58 Tunisia 0.41 -1.48
Djibouti 1.00 -0.06 Malta -1.17 0.55 Turkey -0.25 0.05
Dominica -0.76 1.19 Mauritania 1.13 -0.31 Turkmenistan 1.32 -1.53
Dominican 
Republic 0.01 1.11 Mauritius -0.72 0.79 Uganda 0.86 0.26
Ecuador 0.24 0.56 Mexico -0.22 0.41 Ukraine 0.17 0.92
Egypt 0.68 -0.83 Moldova 0.43 0.46 United Arab Emirates -0.62 -2.83
El Salvador -0.04 0.77 Mongolia 0.14 1.36 United Kingdom -1.64 -0.09
Equatorial 
Guinea 1.30 -1.78 Montenegro -0.27 0.43 United States -1.75 -0.44
Eritrea 1.63 -0.96 Morocco 0.50 -0.17 Uruguay -1.01 0.91
Estonia -1.22 0.61 Mozambique 0.77 1.00 Uzbekistan 1.25 -1.44
Ethiopia 0.99 0.03 Namibia -0.19 1.06 Vanuatu 0.01 1.26
Finland -1.98 -0.39 Nepal 0.84 0.59 Venezuela 0.56 -0.37
France -1.54 0.00 Netherlands -1.92 -0.47 Vietnam 0.87 -0.94
Gabon 0.69 -1.00 New Zealand -1.84 -0.14 Yemen 1.15 -0.30
Gambia 0.94 -0.08 Nicaragua 0.69 0.36 Zambia 0.72 0.85
Georgia 0.11 -0.20  Niger 1.06 0.50     
Source: Authors’ elaboration using survey dataset, various statistical sources; See Section Data.
K-means clustering
Cluster analysis identified four homogeneous groups of countries (Table 
4). Two groups include highly developed countries. The full list of countries 
according to the cluster membership is shown in Table 5. The greatest 
dissimilarities exist between rich non-European countries and economically-
disadvantaged countries, and between economically-disadvantaged countries 
and emerging countries. A considerable distance exists also between developed 
European countries and disadvantaged countries. A non-parametric analysis of 
variance identifies variables used in k-means clustering that differ significantly 
across the clusters (Table 5). The variables contributing the most to cluster 
differentiation are GNI, GE and CL.
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The cluster with the highest number of countries (n = 90) includes the 
economically disadvantaged and poor countries in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America with the lowest CPI score (indicating the highest level of corruption) 
and the highest PR and CL scores (indicating the lowest political rights and 
civil liberties observed across the selected countries). Per capita GNI is less 
than 4,000 international dollars per year and HDI is the lowest among clusters, 
together with a low GE. Examples of countries belonging to this cluster are Cape 
Verde, Congo, Guyana, Honduras, Kiribati, Pakistan, Samoa and Uzbekistan.
Table 4 Results of k-means clustering: average value by variable and group
Cluster # CPI PR GNI HDI GE CL
Developed/consolidated countries, mainly 
European Union countries (1)
24 7.25 1.21 33427 0.88 1.42 1.38
Affluent countries, mainly non-European 
Union countries (3)
10 7.46 3.60 54718 0.86 1.35 2.90
Emerging countries (2) 43 4.21 2.93 16214 0.76 0.21 2.73
Disadvantaged countries (4) 90 2.80 4.32 3607 0.54 -0.63 4.06
Kruskal-Wallis test (p level, * p < 0.05, ** p 
< 0.01)
- * * ** * ** **
Note: The number in parenthesis indicates cluster label, as reported in Table 5. Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric 
analysis of variance was run to identify significant differences in the statistical distribution of each of the six 
variables among clusters.
Source: Authors’ elaboration using survey dataset, various statistical sources, See Section Data.
A total of 43 countries were classified as emerging countries with a 
considerably higher economic level and higher social and political development 
compared to the previous cluster, but unstable political systems and the worst 
government effectiveness. CPI average score is moderately low, indicating quite 
strong perceptions of level of corruption together with relatively high PR and 
CL scores, indicating a modest level of political rights and civil liberties. On 
average, per-capita GNI is higher than 15,000 international dollars per year 
with an intermediate score for the level of human development. Examples of 
countries belonging to this cluster are Argentina, Bahrain, Chile, Brazil, China, 
India, Mexico, Russia and Saudi Arabia.
Only ten countries were classified as affluent countries with high levels 
of economic development (the highest GNI per-capita; on average, 54,718 
international dollars) relatively high government effectiveness and a fairly good 
level of human development. However, in some of these countries both PR and 
CL are relatively high, suggesting heterogeneity in the political systems of 
the two sub-classes participating in the cluster, i.e. (i) high-income and firmly 
democratic countries (United States, Luxembourg, Switzerland and Norway), 
and (ii) high-income and partly free (Hong Kong, Kuwait and Singapore) or not 
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free countries (United Arab Emirates, Brunei, and Qatar). Interestingly, the CPI 
average score is the highest observed in the first sub-class (8.0), indicating low or 
very low levels of corruption. In the second sub-class, the related countries are 
associated with higher levels of corruption (6.5) than the first, with the exception 
of Singapore (9.3), which is considered one of the least corrupted countries in 
the world.
Finally, 24 countries were classified as developed and consolidated 
democracies, located mainly in the European Union with high economic and 
social development and the highest HDI, on average. PR and CL both reach the 
highest score, indicating the highest level of political rights and civil liberties. 
The CPI average score is similar to that observed for the affluent, mainly non-
European Union countries and indicates a low corruption level with the highest 
government effectiveness among the clusters. Examples of countries belonging 
to this cluster are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Greece, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, 
France, Germany and Denmark. 
Table 5 Cluster membership by country and distance from the cluster’s centroid
Country
Cluster
Country
Cluster
Country
Cluster
# Distance  # Distance  # Distance
Afghanistan 4 1.1 Germany 1 1.8 Nigeria 4 0.6
Albania 4 2.0 Ghana  4 0.8 Norway 3 1.3
Algeria 4 1.8 Greece 1 2.5 Oman   1 3.3
Angola 4 0.6 Guatemala  4 0.4 Pakistan   4 0.3
Argentina  2 0.4 Guinea 4 1.1 Panama 2 1.4
Armenia 4 0.8 Guinea–Bissau   4 1.0 Papua New Guinea        4 0.5
Australia  1 1.3 Guyana 4 0.1 Paraguay   4 0.6
Austria 1 2.4 Haiti  4 1.0 Peru   4 2.3
Azerbaijan 4 2.3 Honduras   4 0.1 Philippines 2 0.1
Bahrain 2 2.0 Hong Kong  3 3.0 Poland 2 1.1
Bangladesh 4 0.7 Hungary 2 1.3 Portugal   1 3.3
Barbados   2 1.0 Iceland 1 1.8 Qatar  3 8.9
Belarus 2 1.2 India  2 0.1 Romania 2 0.9
Belgium 1 1.8 Indonesia  4 0.2 Russia 2 1.1
Benin  4 0.8 Iran   2 2.0 Rwanda 4 1.0
Bhutan 4 0.6 Iraq   4 0.1 Samoa  4 0.3
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Country
Cluster
Country
Cluster
Country
Cluster
# Distance  # Distance  # Distance
Bolivia 4 0.4 Ireland 1 0.1 Sao Tome Principe   4 0.7
Bosnia Herzegovina 4 2.1 Israel 1 3.3 Saudi Arabia            2 2.7
Botswana   2 1.1 Italy  1 0.8 Senegal 4 0.7
Brazil 2 2.2 Jamaica 4 1.6 Serbia 2 2.2
Brunei 3 2.0 Japan  1 0.4 Seychelles 2 2.5
Bulgaria   2 1.2 Jordan 4 0.9 Sierra Leone            4 1.1
Burkina Faso            4 1.0 Kazakhstan 2 2.4 Singapore  3 0.9
Burundi 4 1.2 Kenya  4 0.8 Slovakia   2 2.2
Cambodia   4 0.6 Kiribati   4 0.0 Slovenia   1 3.0
Cameroon   4 0.5 Korea (South)      1 2.0 Solomon Islands         4 0.6
Canada 1 1.9 Kuwait 3 0.6 South Africa            2 2.5
Cape Verde 4 0.0 Kyrgyzstan  4 0.6 Spain  1 1.0
Cent. African 
Republic 4 1.2 Laos   4 0.5 Sri Lanka  4 0.6
Chad   4 0.9 Latvia 2 0.1 Sudan  4 0.6
Chile  2 0.6 Lebanon 2 1.1 Swaziland  4 0.8
China  2 1.6 Lesotho 4 0.7 Sweden 1 2.6
Colombia   4 2.2 Liberia 4 1.3 Switzerland 3 1.9
Comoros 4 1.0 Libya  2 0.1 Syria  4 0.6
Congo – 
Brazzaville     4 0.2 Lithuania  2 0.6 Tajikistan 4 0.6
Costa Rica 2 2.1 Luxembourg 3 2.7 Tanzania   4 0.9
Cote d’Ivoire           4 0.7 Madagascar 4 1.1 Thailand   4 1.9
Croatia 2 0.9 Malawi 4 1.1 Togo   4 1.1
Cyprus 1 1.2 Malaysia   2 0.9 Tonga  4 0.4
Czech Republic          2 2.9 Maldives   4 1.7 Trinidad Tobago     2 3.3
Denmark 1 3.0 Mali   4 1.1 Tunisia 4 2.2
Djibouti   4 0.5 Malta  2 3.2 Turkey 2 0.4
Dominica   2 1.8 Mauritania 4 0.5 Turkmenistan            4 1.6
Dominican 
Republic      4 2.2 Mauritius  2 1.1 Uganda 4 1.0
Ecuador 4 1.7 Mexico 2 0.8 Ukraine 4 1.2
Egypt  4 1.0 Moldova 4 0.1 United Arab Emir. 3 3.2
El Salvador 4 1.2 Mongolia   4 0.0 United Kingdom          1 0.8
Equatorial Guinea    2 2.3 Montenegro 2 1.5 United States           3 3.0
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Country
Cluster
Country
Cluster
Country
Cluster
# Distance  # Distance  # Distance
Eritrea 4 1.3 Morocco 4 0.4 Uruguay 2 1.2
Estonia 2 1.2 Mozambique 4 1.1 Uzbekistan 4 0.2
Ethiopia   4 1.1 Namibia   4 1.1 Vanuatu 4 0.3
Finland   1 1.3 Nepal  4 1.0 Venezuela  2 1.8
France 1 0.4 Netherlands 1 3.3 Vietnam 4 0.2
Gabon  2 1.4 New Zealand 1 1.9 Yemen  4 0.5
Gambia 4 0.7 Nicaragua  4 0.4 Zambia 4 0.9
Georgia 4 0.5  Niger  4 1.2     
Developed/consolidated countries,  
EU Code 1 Affluent countries, mainly non-EU Code 3
Emerging countries Code 2 Disadvantaged countries Code 4
Source: Authors’elaboration using survey dataset, various statistical sources; See Section Data.
DISCUSSION
The analysis presented in this study highlights that the level of economic 
development, the perception of the level of corruption, the degree of human 
development, the extent of government effectiveness and the quality of the existing 
political system are important dimensions shaping overall developmental patterns 
worldwide. Empirical results corroborate earlier assumptions, demonstrating 
that corruption is low where all other factors considered here are high (level 
of economic development, degree of government effectiveness, quality of 
human development and political democracy). Corruption is also correlated to 
the nature of polity and political institutions, indicating that a well-functioning 
democracy may serve as a relevant tool for a country’s development. Based on 
these findings, social and political efforts should be made – in addiction to strictly 
economic policies – to increase or consolidate the level of overall development. 
This statement is in line with the observed correlation between governance 
effectiveness and CPI, possibly indicating the role of the state in the creation of a 
“fair” society, reconnecting to the assumptions mentioned above. Improving the 
quality of public services, increasing the independence of state bureaucracy from 
political pressures, improving the effectiveness of processes of policy formulation 
(and implementation) and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such 
policies reduces the motives of voters, state officials and politicians to resort to 
corruption. As a result, these policies may increase overall development.
Per-capita income is strongly correlated with the degree of corruption 
worldwide. High values of GNIpc,ppp are associated with high values of CPI, 
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indicating a low perceived level of corruption. However, the effective control 
of corruption should not be misinterpreted and considered a “luxury good” 
that people demand once their incomes increase to a certain level (Sioussiouras 
– Vavouras 2012). This is achieved only through the adoption and effective 
implementation of the appropriate long-term economic, social and political 
processes. The level of corruption is particularly high in low-income countries 
because corruption is considered, to some extent, to be a “survival strategy.” In 
these countries, increasing personal income is a strong motive and is becoming 
stronger due to conditions of utter deprivation and low public sector salaries. In 
order to survive and support their families, low-paid public sector employees may 
need to moonlight or accept small bribes, especially when their jobs are associated 
with a high degree of uncertainty, mainly due to political instability, that reduces 
the probability of future wage appropriation. According to this line of thought, 
corruption is a “disease” caused by poverty, or a by-product of poverty that only 
diminishes when economies develop, as the multivariate analysis implemented 
in our study may demonstrate. A high level of human development is positively 
correlated with all remaining factors considered in this study. Improving quality 
of life and rising levels of education, apart from rising incomes, also increase the 
level of overall development. Investments into human capital should be considered 
the most productive form of investment associated with overall development.
The political system seems to be another critical factor that affects the level 
of overall development worldwide. A strong negative correlation was observed 
between (i) PR and CL and (ii) CPI and GE. The higher the PR and CL (that is, the 
more a country is associated with reduced freedom), the higher the corruption 
and the lower the government effectiveness. The political system seems to be less 
well associated with economic development as expressed by GNI in the present 
study, possibly due to high heterogeneity in countries’ datasets.
Consequently, the long-lasting and true democratic forms of government 
and the establishment of a genuine democratic tradition prove to be decisive 
factors, guaranteeing a high overall development level, contributing specifically 
to a decrease in corruption and government effectiveness levels. The smooth 
functioning of democratic institutions and civil liberties is thus considered a 
prerequisite for achieving and maintaining high levels of development. Notions 
such as transparency, collectivism, rule of law, freedom of expression, association 
and organization, constitute the ingredients for a successful and smooth operation 
of a lawful state (Rothstein – Teorell 2008). Western-type democracies owe their 
prosperity and overall development to a great extent exactly to these factors, which 
are partly redundant – as Principal Component Analysis has outlined clearly. As 
indicated by non-parametric correlations and the PCA, substitutability among 
factors is partial and significant pair-wise relationships are often non-linear, 
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suggesting that a renewed developmental vision should formulate strategies that 
are adapted to individual contexts and underlying conditions of growth, which are 
changing rapidly following recent socioeconomic challenges.
According to the mean value of the above variables that represents multiple 
aspects of socioeconomic development, world countries may be clustered 
into four categories with a specific profile. The first cluster includes wealthy 
(mostly European) countries that have medium-high economic performance 
accompanied by the highest scores in political and social development as 
expressed by the very low corruption, the highest political rights, civil liberties, 
human development and government effectiveness. In achieving this combination 
we can say that Europe is the region with the highest overall development in the 
world, with a balanced form of development with strong concern for society and 
the political system. In this sense, economic development is partly sacrificed in 
order to maintain and improve the functioning of social and political institutions. 
However, moderate heterogeneity was also observed in this cluster, possibly 
associated with a consolidating divide between western and northern European 
countries and southern (Mediterranean) countries (e.g. Carlucci et al. 2017). The 
second cluster represents the very rich countries of North America (USA), and 
the Middle East with the lowest corruption and high government effectiveness, 
but also with some problems with political development. The aforementioned 
countries seem to give priority to economic and social development but have 
a moderate gap in political development in respect of Europe, a fact that may 
reduce the overall development level.
A third cluster contains emerging countries with medium-low per-capita, 
relatively high perceived corruption levels and low political development and 
government effectiveness. The score for human development is not much less than 
the score for the aforementioned clusters. Political problems and a government 
with very low effectiveness in these countries seem to be serious handicaps to 
achieving a higher level of overall development, as described in the present study.
Finally, a fourth cluster containing more than 50% (actually 53.9%) of the 
countries  examined in this analysis includes economically-deprived economies 
(with GNI equal to 22% of that of the emerging countries) and low scores for all 
indexes of social and political development. Low performance in all dimensions 
of development is typical of this cluster and is additional evidence that social, 
political and economic aspects of development are interrelated and no single one 
can be omitted from the developmental path. High values for these dimensions 
create “virtuous cycles” for development, while low values create “vicious 
cycles” of development.
Policy instruments suitable for increasing the level of overall development of 
countries require an integrated strategy for reducing corruption and stimulating 
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both human development and government effectiveness. However, in order to 
be effective, these strategies should be associated with the necessary democratic 
transformations. If the political system is considered “not free,” a high overall 
level of development cannot be achieved and maintained, mainly because 
corruption cannot be effectively reduced in spite of the prevailing high income 
levels. The examples of Brunei, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates confirm 
this conclusion, with the astonishing exception of Singapore which, although 
considered a high income and partly free country, is one of the least corrupted 
countries in the world. This outcome could be attributed to cultural factors 
not examined in the present study. A high overall level of development is thus 
achieved and maintained in the long term only when socioeconomic development 
is associated with the consolidation of democracy. Increasing incomes is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for increasing overall development.
CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this paper was to propose a classification of world countries 
according to relevant political, economic and social factors. While previous 
studies have empirically investigated the extent of corruption in various countries 
by analyzing differences in the respective values of the corruption perception 
index, the variables used in the present study are gross national income per 
head in purchasing power parities, the non-income human development index, 
the political rights index, and the civil liberties index. Based on the selected 
indicators, analysis of the socioeconomic context in the investigated countries 
provides some interesting results from a policy perspective by developing a 
comprehensive analysis of corruption corrected by socioeconomic factors (e.g. 
Tiihonen 2003). The research in this paper tested the hypothesis that developing 
countries have unbalanced socioeconomic contexts due to rapid economic 
growth with impact on corruption levels. Although affluent and socially-
developed countries are relatively well distinguished from both emerging 
and economically-disadvantaged countries, these categories do not reflect the 
marked heterogeneity observed within countries. The lack of homogeneity 
within the groups should be attributed to institutional, territorial, political and 
cultural factors rather than to crude differences in the level of economic growth 
quantified by way of per capita income. This suggests that policies against 
corruption should target a complex, although balanced set of causes that are 
not only limited to the strictly economic performance of the country but range 
from the social sphere to political, cultural, institutional and environmental 
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attributes. Further studies that employ a hierarchical clustering of world 
countries according to the multivariate, diachronic attributes of socioeconomic 
development are thus necessary for understanding the gains and losses in 
economic performance and competitiveness across countries, and for clarifying 
the more subtle differences in the social and political systems of specific country 
clusters characterized by similar levels of income and economic productivity.
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